Abstract. In this paper we present a new practical key-recovery attack on the SFLASH signature scheme. SFLASH is a derivative of the older C * encryption and signature scheme that was broken in 1995 by Patarin. In SFLASH, the public key is truncated, and this simple countermeasure prevents Patarin's attack. The scheme is well-known for having been considered secure and selected in 2004 by the NESSIE project of the European Union to be standardized. However, SFLASH was practically broken in 2007 by Dubois, Fouque, Stern and Shamir. Their attack breaks the original (and most relevant) parameters, but does not apply when more than half of the public key is truncated. It is therefore possible to choose parameters such that SFLASH is not broken by the existing attacks, although it is less efficient. We show a key-recovery attack that breaks the full range of parameters in practice, as soon as the information-theoretically required amount of information is available from the public-key. The attack uses new cryptanalytic tools, most notably pencils of matrices and quadratic forms.
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Multivariate polynomials have been used in cryptography as early as in 1984, mostly with the purpose of designing RSA variants with faster decryption [11, 12, 5] . At about the same time, Matsumoto and Imai designed the first publickey scheme explicitly based on the hardness of MQ. In fact, they had several proposal, but only a single one (their "Scheme A") made it to the general crypto community, and was presented at Eurocrypt'88 [10] under the name C * . It is very similar to RSA, as its only non-linear component is a power function over a finite field. However, unlike RSA this power function is an easy-to-invert bijection, therefore in C * it is composed with two secret invertible linear maps that destroy its algebraic structure. We therefore see C * as an attempt to obfuscate a power function in F q n by presenting it as a collection of n quadratic polynomials in n variables over F q .
Several years later, Patarin found a devastating attack against C * , allowing to decrypt and to forge signatures in a few seconds [13] . He showed that there always are bilinear relations between the ciphertext and the plaintext, which can be easily discovered by the adversary. This allows for an efficient attack by substituting the ciphertext into the bilinear relations, which results in a system of linear equations whose solution is the plaintext.
The SFLASH signature scheme [14] is a derivative of the original C * that was proposed in 2001 by Courtois, Goubin and Patarin. It is famous for having been selected in 2003 by the NESSIE European project to be proposed to the standardization bodies.
The idea behind SFLASH is to take the original C * but to throw away a part of the output. The resulting trapdoor one-way function can no longer be used for encryption, but it can still be used for signatures. This is achieved by removing a part of the public key, which is the obfuscated description of the power function. The idea of removing some of the public polynomials has been originally suggested by Shamir [15] , and was called the "Minus transform". The original C * with the minus transform is thus often called C * − . This countermeasure is very effective since it avoids the reconstruction of the bilinear relations and makes it much harder to compute Gröbner basis of the public key.
SFLASH has in turn been very badly broken in 2007 when Dubois, Fouque, Stern and Shamir found a practical forgery attack [4, 3] , and further broken in 2008 when Fouque, Macario-Rat and Stern found a practical key-recovery attack [6] . Both attacks are very practical, defeating the actual SFLASH parameters in minutes. They are essentially polynomial in the security parameter(s), so that there is no hope that increasing them may make the scheme simultaneously secure and usable.
However, both attacks only apply as long as the number of removed polynomials is less than half of the total number. There are therefore unbroken ranges of parameters, even though they are less practical than the original (defeated) proposal. For instance, let us consider the parameters q = 128 and n = 257. The original C * public key would be made of 257 polynomial in 257 variables over F 128 . If we throw away 75% of the public key, we obtain a C * − public-key with 64 multivariate quadratic polynomials in 257 variables, and the existing attacks do no apply. The signatures are 1799-bit long, and the public-key is 1.8Mbyte long. Forging a signature by exhaustive search requires 2 448 trials, and computing a Gröbner basis should require even more arithmetic operations.
Our Contribution. We show that SFLASH/C * − can be broken regardless of the fraction of the public that was thrown away, thus improving on the previous attacks. We present a practical key-only attack that recovers the secret-key and applies as soon as three polynomials from the public key are available. This happen to be the information-theoretic minimum quantity of data required to uniquely characterize the set of possible secret keys. The attack has been implemented and tested. It runs very efficiently, and breaks in practice all the meaningful ranges of parameters. For instance, the particular parameters mentioned in the previous paragraph can be broken in about 10 hours using a single computer.
SFLASH had already been thrown out of the league of possible alternatives to RSA of discrete-logarithm based schemes by the previous attacks. The contribution of this work is not only to further break SFLASH, but also to introduce new cryptanalytic techniques. To achieve our results, we make use of mathematical tools that were not previously used in multivariate cryptanalysis, such as pencils of matrices or quadratic forms, adjugate matrices, simultaneous diagonalization of quadratic forms, kernels of quadratic forms, etc. We expect that some of these tools might apply further to other schemes, in particular those sharing some features with SFLASH, notably HFE.
Organization of the paper
In section 2, we present some mathematical background. Then, in section 3, we describe the C * and SFLASH signature schemes. In section 4, we investigate in great detail the mathematical properties of C * and find exploitable relations between the secret and public keys. Finally, we expose our key-recovery attack in section 5, and given experimental results.
Mathematical Background
Finite Fields. Let K the finite field with q elements, where q is a power of two, and F an extension of K of degree n. Recall that F is isomorphic to K n , so that we often identify the two spaces. The trace on F over K is the K-linear map defined by Tr
Both Tr F/K and are functions from F to K, and we simply note them Tr and N since there is no confusion. The map x → x q is called the Frobenius map, and it is a field automorphism. Lemma 1. For any K-linear mapping L on F over K, there exists an element λ of F such that, for all x in F, L(x) = Tr(λx). Moreover, if Tr(λx) = 0 for all x ∈ F, then λ = 0.
Quadratic forms. A quadratic form over K is a degree 2 homogeneous polynomial:
It is well-known that over fields of characteristic not two, a quadratic form Q is uniquely represented by its polar form, i.e., the symmetric bilinear form defined by ψ(Q) : (x, y) → 1/2 · (Q(x + y) − Q(x) − Q(y)), with the nice property that Q(x) = φ(Q)(x, x). Over fields of characteristic two, this is however no longer possible, because the division by two is not defined. In this paper, we will slightly abuse the usual definition, and we define the polar form of a quadratic form to be the symmetric bilinear form:
Given a basis b 1 , . . . , b n of F, ψ(Q) can be represented by a n × n symmetric matrix whose (i, j) coefficient is ψ(Q) (b i , b j ). By an abuse of notation, we will often identify ψ(Q) with its matrix representation.
The Kernel of a Quadratic Form. The kernel of a quadratic form Q, also called the radical of Q is the vector space of elements a ∈ F such that for any x ∈ F, ψ(Q)(x, a) = 0. It is easy to see that the kernel of a quadratic form is the kernel of the matrix ψ(Q). What makes the kernel interesting is that in characteristic two, when n is odd, all quadratic forms have a non-trivial kernel.
Theorem 1 ([1]
). Let q be a power of two, and let Q be a quadratic form over K. Then the rank of φ(Q) is even.
Linear Algebra. We denote the characteristic polynomial of M by χ (M ). A minor of M is simply the determinant of a submatrix of M . We will use in the following the adjugate matrix adj(M ) of a matrix M . We recall that it is the transpose of the comatrix, which is the matrix of the cofactors. A cofactor of M , cof i,j (M ) is the determinant of the submatrix M j i
, where in this notation we refer to the matrix M without the ith row and the jth column. We lastly recall two well-known results connecting a matrix M and its adjugate.
The rank of adj(M ) can be deduced from the rank of M :
-In all other cases, rank(adj(M )) = 0. * and SFLASH Signature Schemes
The basic idea underlying both C * and SFLASH is to hide an easily invertible function φ in the large finite field F using two secret invertible linear (or affine) maps S and T which mix together the n coordinates of φ over the small field K, with PK = T • φ • S. The signature of a message y is a vector x such that PK(x) = y. The legitimate signer easily computes x by successively inverting T, φ and then S.
Let π be the canonical isomorphism between K n and F, and let φ be defined by φ(X) = X 1+q θ . Enforcing that gcd(1 + q θ , q n − 1) = 1 makes φ bijective.
Because we may write φ(X) = X · X q θ , we find that φ is in fact the product of two linear functions (recall that the Frobenius map and its iterates are linear).
is a vector whose coordinates are quadratic forms in the coordinates of x. For the sake of lighter notations, we omit π in the sequel.
The secret key of the scheme is composed by the two invertible n×n matrices S and T with coefficients in K. The exponent θ and π are public parameters. The public-key of the scheme is formed by the representation over K n of T • φ • S. More precisely, if T i denotes the i-th line of T , then the public key of C * is the vector of n quadratic forms over K n :
The public key of SFLASH is composed of the first r quadratic forms P 1 , . . . , P r . Typical values of the parameter may be the ones defined for SFLASH V3: q = 128, n = 67, r = 56 and θ = 33. Although the public key is a vector of polynomials in (K[x 1 , . . . , x n ]) n , it is more convenient to see them as functions from F to K. We therefore write
Equivalent Secret Keys. Given a public-key, there are many possible corresponding secret keys (there are "equivalent" secret keys [18] ). A key-recovery attack is expected to retrieve one possible secret key amongst those generating the targeted public-key. The existence of many equivalent secret keys gives some freedom to the attacker: we may be guaranteed that there is an equivalent secret key satisfying some interesting property.
is an SFLASH secret-key that generates the public key PK, then for any integer k > 1 there is an equivalent secret key (S , T ) in which
Proof. Because the function x ∈ F → a · x is linear over F, it can be represented by a matrix M a over K n . The key idea is that multiplications "commute" with the internal power function:
Now, we pick a such that a 1+q θ = T 1 (this is always possible because the power function is bijective). Thus, a possible equivalent secret key is such that T i = T i /T 1 , and S = M a · S.
Next, it follows from the definition of the trace, and from the identity x q n = x which holds over F that Tr x q k = Tr(x). This shows that
Thus, if F denotes the matrix representing the Frobenius, i.e., the linear map x → x q in F, then a possible equivalent secret key is such that
Mathematical Properties of C * − Public Keys
The aim of this section is to exhibit relations involving the secret elements S and the T i 's on the one hand, and the public key on the other hand, in such a way that the secrets can be easily reconstructed given only a small number of public polynomials. For this purpose, we consider two public polynomials P i and P j , and we define the pencil of quadratic forms P = λP i + µP j , with λ, µ in K. We also define the pencil of vectors T = λT i + µT j , and because the Trace is K-linear we have:
We are interested in the kernel of P, which is by definition the set of vectors a such that for any x, ψ(P)(a, x) = 0. In fact, it is simply the kernel of the matrix representation of the polar form ψ(P). We first relate the kernel of P to the components of the secret key in section 4.1, and then with the components of the public-key in section 4.2. This allows us, by "transitivity", to find exploitable relations between the public key and the secret elements in section 4.3.
In the sequel, we adopt the typographic convention that any quantity that depends implicitly on λ and µ is written in bold.
Relations Between the Kernel and the Secret-Key
It is not very surprising that the kernel of P admits a relatively simple expression in terms of the components of the secret key.
Theorem 3. Given that n is odd, and gcd(θ, n) = 1, we have:
(ii) The matrix pencil φ(P) has rank n − 1.
(iii) When (λ, µ) = (0, 0), there exists a unique vector a ∈ K n in the kernel of P such that P(a) = 1.
Proof. It is known that the polar forms of C * polynomials have a special shape:
After some manipulations, by exploiting the linearity of the Frobenius, of the Trace, and the fact that they commute, we find when x = 0:
Now, inside the trace, the first term of the product depends only on x, and the second member takes all possible values in F when y ranges across F, because S and the Frobenius are bijective. Lemma 1 then tells us that if x = 0 belongs to the kernel of P, then when iθ is congruent to 1 modulo n, the equation implies X + X q = 0, which shows that the solutions all lies in K. This establishes point (i).
Let us prove point (ii). The polar form φ(P) cannot be of rank n, because it is a skew-symmetric matrix and n is odd (this is well-known for matrices over fields, and is extended to the case of matrices multivariate polynomial rings in lemma 8, appendix A). Now, we show that the rank of φ(P) is greater than n−1. If we specialize (λ, µ) to any value in K 2 distinct from (0, 0), then by point (i) φ(λP i + µP j ), seen as a matrix with entries in K, has a kernel of dimension 1. By the rank theorem (over K), its rank is then n − 1. This shows that there is a non-zero minor of dimension (n − 1). This minor (seen as a polynomial in λ and µ) cannot be the zero polynomial, otherwise it could become non-zero for a particular choice of λ and µ in K, hence the rank of φ(P) (seen as a matrix with entries in K[λ, µ] has rank exactly n − 1.
Point (iii) follows immediately from (i) and from the fact S, T and the power function are bijective. To establish point (iv), we need to find a suitable value δ such that S (a) = T δ . By definition of a, we should have T δ 1+q θ · T = 1, so that δ satisfies the equation 1 + δ(1 + q θ ) = 0 modulo (q n − 1). Checking that the given value of δ is valid is technical and not very interesting, and we refer the reader to [8] for more details.
The fourth point of theorem 3 makes it possible to explicitly write down the expression of a, the kernel vector introduced in the proposition, as a function of λ and µ. Let us set d = (n − 1)/2, and let us introduce P N , P S ∈ F[λ, µ]:
The idea is that p N only depends on T , while p S depends "linearly" on S. It is fairly obvious that p N has total degree n while p S has total degree d. Next, we claim that p N in fact has coefficients in K. A possible way to see this is that because it coincides with the Norm, it takes values in K when λ, µ ∈ K, and therefore it could be interpolated as a polynomial of K[λ, µ].
We have carefully chosen p N and p S so that the vector a defined in point (iii) of proposition 3 is such that:
This fact is an easy consequence of the fourth point of proposition 3. Note that because p N has values in K, then p S (λ, µ) spans the kernel of P, but unlike a, p S does not a priori satisfy the additional condition that P(p S ) = 1. It follows, by definition of a, because P(λx) = λ 2 P(x) when λ ∈ K and because x −1 = x q−2 in K, that:
And we find that p N = P(p S ). The two polynomials p N and p S play a crucial role in the sequel: we will show in section 5 that knowing them is sufficient to reconstruct the secret key in polynomial time. In addition, we will also show that they can be reconstructed in polynomial time from the public-key. However, doing this requires some more mathematical machinery.
Relations Between the Kernel and the Public Key
The kernel of P can be computed using only publicly available information, since it only depends on the public polynomials. If the values of λ and µ were fixed, this could be achieved with standard linear algebra. More sophisticated computer algebra systems have functions that compute a basis of the kernel in terms of λ and µ. We remove the need for such sophisticated operations by explicitly giving the form of the kernel.
Theorem 4. Let P be a pencil of two public polynomials, B = {b 1 , . . . , b n } a basis of K n . There exists a vector k = (k 1 , . . . , k n ) of degree-d homogeneous bivariate polynomials in K[λ, µ], such that:
i) The adjugate matrix of the polar form of P can be expressed the tensor product of k with itself:
ii) the kernel of ψ(P) is spanned by
Proof. According to theorem 3, item (ii), the matrix pencil ψ(P) is of rank n−1, and lemma 2 states that in this case adj(ψ(P)) has rank 1. We will now show that adj(ψ(P)) is the square of some other matrix, but we first require a technical lemma.
Lemma 4. Let P be an arbitrary pencil of quadratic forms. There exists a family of bivariate polynomials p 0 , . . . , p d ∈ K[λ, µ] such that p i is homogeneous of degree i, and the characteristic polynomial of the polar form of P is:
The proof of lemma 4 is postponed to appendix A. It follows from lemma 4 and theorem 2 that:
We denote by R the natural square-root of adj(ψ(P)) occurring on the right-hand side. It is a symmetric matrix pencil whose coefficients are bivariate polynomials of degree d in λ and µ. Let us consider the i-th diagonal term of adj(ψ(P)). We find:
Consequently, let us define k i = n j=1 R i,j . The previous equation tells us that adj(ψ(P)) i,i = k i 2 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. This establishes point (i) for the diagonal of adj(ψ(P)) only.
Let us now consider the other terms with i = j. Since adj(ψ(P)) is of rank 1, we know that all the minors of dimension 2 of adj(ψ(P)) obtained by keeping only the i-th row and the j-th column is null. This yields:
and consequently adj(ψ(P)) i,j = k i ·k j (when the field is of characteristic two, the square root always exists and is unique because the Frobenius map is bijective). This completes the proof of (i).
Let us now focus on point (ii). One of the k i 's at least is non-zero, because adj(ψ(P)) is not the null matrix. We therefore assume (without loss of generality) that k 1 is non-zero, and we consider the matrix relation given by theorem 2:
ψ(P) · adj(ψ(P)) = 0.
Looking at the first column of the product, we conclude that
and because k 1 is non-zero, we conclude that ψ(P) · (
In light of theorem 4, it seems that we can derive from the public key a polynomial whose properties mimic those of p S . Keeping the notations of the theorem, we define:
We deduce from theorem 4 that p S has the same degree as p S , and that like p S , it spans the kernel of ψ(P). We also need to find a polynomial p N that would be an analogous of p N and that could be derived from the public key. Note that it immediately follows from theorem 4 that p S spans the kernel of P.
Relations Between the Secret-Key and the Public-Key
The last (but not least) step of our analysis is to show that the two polynomials p N , p S derived from the secret key in section 4.1 on the one hand, and the polynomials p N , p S derived from the public key in section 4.2 are in general equal up to a constant multiplicative factor.
Theorem 5. If T 2 /T 1 is primitive over F (i.e., generates the multiplicative group of F), then there exists a constant ζ = 0 in K such that p S = ζ · p S , and (accordingly)
Proof. The first step of the proof is to show that p N has degree n, just like p N . The polynomials k 1 , . . . , k n defined in theorem 4 have coefficients in K, and are homogeneous of degree d. We can therefore find a family c 0 , . . . , c d of coefficients in F such that:
It turns out that this family enjoys a nice property: over the subspace of K n that it spans, the pencil P is in fact a diagonal form (i.e., the two public polynomial it is made of are simultaneously diagonal).
Lemma 5. ψ(P)(c i , c j ) = 0 for any 0 ≤ i, j ≤ d.
Lemma 6. For any family {r i } 0≤i≤d of polynomials over K, we have
The proofs are postponed to appendix B. Applying lemma 6 to (4), we get:
From there, it is easy to see that p N has degree 2d + 1 = n. Now that it has been established that p N and p N have the same degree, we will use irreducibility properties of p N to conclude the proof of theorem 5. We first claim that the univariate polynomial p N (λ, 1) ∈ K[λ] is irreducible over K. After a few manipulations we find
Thus T 2 /T 1 , which is primitive over F, is a root of p N (λ, 1), and this polynomial is therefore irreducible over K.
ζ · p S = ζ · p S and gcd ζ, ζ = 1.
Proof. First, the rank of the two-column matrix (p S , p S ) is one. If it were two, then this matrix could be extended to a n × n matrix M of rank n. We then find that the rank of ψ(P) · M would be at most n − 2, since its two first columns are null, which contradicts the fact established earlier that ψ(P) has rank n − 1.
There exist polynomials { i } such that p S = n i=1 i · b i . We now argue that there exists an index i 0 such that k i0 = 0 and i0 = 0. The reasoning is by contradiction: assume that for all i we have k i · i = 0. Since p S = 0 and p S = 0, there exist indices i, j such that k i = 0 and j = 0. By hypothesis, k j = 0 and i = 0. But then, we find that
Consequently, a minor of dimension two of (p S , p S ) is non-zero, which contradict the fact that it is of rank one.
We can therefore assume without loss of generality that k 1 = 0 and 1 = 0. The linear combination k 1 · p S + 1 · p S is null since by construction its first coordinate is zero, and the other coordinates are minors of dimension 2 of (p S , p S ) and are also null. We can now assert that the pair
satisfies the requirements of the lemma.
Let ζ, ζ a pair of bivariate polynomials over K satisfying lemma 7. By applying P, we get:
Any irreducible factor of ζ must divide p N since it does not divide ζ. But because p N is irreducible, ζ is necessarily of degree 0. And ζ is also degree 0 because p N and p N have the same degree. This concludes the proof of theorem 5.
We conclude this section by giving one last important but somewhat technical result. The polynomial p S is "designed" to reveal the image of S on the subspace of K n spanned by its d + 1 coefficients (seen as vectors of K n ). It does actually matter whether these are linearly independent or not. The proof is given in appendix C.
The Attack
We are now ready to leverage our in-depth investigation of the properties of C * , by presenting a practical key-recovery attack that does not require any signature. The global attack strategy is to compute the polynomials p N and p S defined in section 4.2. Then, theorem 5 tells us that with non-negligible probability, these are equal to the polynomials p N and p S defined in section 4.1, from which the secret-key can be efficiently recovered.
Reconstructing the Polynomials p N and p S . Given a pencil P = λP i +µP j of polynomials from the public key, we first show how the polynomials p N and p S defined in section 4.2 can be determined. More precisely, we show how to build a function Kernel-Recovery(P) that returns the two polynomials p N and p S described in section 4.1. Because p N = P(p S ), we focus our attention on the nonobvious part consisting in recovering p S . This can be achieved in two different ways. A first possibility is to follow the proof of theorem 4, which results in the following procedure:
1. Compute the characteristic polynomial ζ of φ(P) and factor it into
Note that computing the characteristic polynomial can be achieved over any commutative ring using the division-free algorithm of Mahajan and Vinay [9] . Computing the factorization of the characteristic polynomial is a (classical) multivariate factorization problem. Both functionality are available in several computer algebra systems, including (but not limited to) MAGMA [2] and SAGE [17] .
Alternatively, we may directly compute a basis of ker φ(P) (which is a module over K[λ, µ]) using the ad hoc function present in some computer algebra systems. This function is for instance available in MAGMA, and seems to rely on Gröbner basis computations. It is apparently much faster than the previous option.
From Kernel to Secret-Key. Let us call (T , S ) the equivalent key we try to forge. Thanks to lemma 3, we know that we may without loss of generality assume that T 1 = 1 and T 2 = (T 2 /T 1 ) q i , for any i > 0. This shows that if (p N , p S ) = Kernel-Recovery(λP 1 + µP 2 ), then we may safely choose T 2 to be any root of p N (λ, 1) different from one. We then focus on equation (3):
Given the values of T 1 and T 2 , we may explicitly evaluate the product on the right-hand side. Identifying both sides coefficient-wise then reveals the image of S on the subspace of K n spanned by the d + 1 coefficients of the product. Theorem 6 tells us that this subspace is of dimension d + 1 with non-negligible probability.
To complete the key-recovery of the secret element, we use a third polynomial from the public-key. We compute (p N , p S ) = Kernel-Recovery(λP 1 + µP 3 ). Only one of the roots of p N yields a valid choice for T 3 , therefore we pick one at random, and we will try again with another one in case of failure in the subsequent steps. Knowledge of T 1 and T 3 allows to discover the image of S on another subspace spanned by d + 1 generators following the same procedure.
At this point, we have learned the image of S on n + 1 vectors, and we really hope that S is completely revealed. If it is not the case, we may try again with P 4 instead of P 3 . Once S is known, finding the other T i 's can be done by straightforward linear algebra. If no solution exists for any of them, then our guess for T 3 was wrong.
Complexity
We implemented the whole key-recovery using the MAGMA computer algebra system. The code of the full attack is 120 lines long, and is available on the web page of the first author. We first applied the attack to SFLASH v2 and SFLASH v3, that were already broken (universal forgery) by Dubois, Fouque, Stern and Shamir [3] , and further broken (key-recovery) by Fouque, Macario-Rat and Stern [6] . We then applied the attack to SFLASH instances that cannot be broken by the existing attack, because the number of polynomials in the public key is less than n/2. We tried various combinations of field size and variable numbers, and found out that the attack works quite well in practice, as Table 1 shows. There are thus no longer any practically unbroken set of parameters for SFLASH. Proof. We will prove it by induction on the number of non null polynomials in the family. We have P (r 1 · c 1 ) = r 1 2 · P (c 1 ) since P is a (pencil of) quadratic form(s) whose coefficients are bivariate polynomials over K. Let us assume that the result holds for k − 1 polynomial. According to the definition of the polar form, we can write:
SFLASH
And lemma 10 allows to conclude.
C Showing Independence of the Coefficients of a Polynomial
We concentrate on a simpler polynomial of the form 
We also recall the following lemma useful to prove that a family of elements in F is independent [7] . Lemma 12. Let A = {α i } 0≤i≤d a family of elements of F. The elements in A are independent if and only if the determinant of the matrix (α
Let t an element of F. In a first step we try to find an equivalent condition to the fact that the coefficients of the polynomial These coefficients can be expressed using the elementary symmetric polynomials. They are equal to {σ i,d (t, t q , . . . , t
We describe some notations. We denote by s i,d and ∆ d the mapping over F defined by: Using the above lemma, and these notations, we can say that the coefficients of the polynomial Proof. We have the following relations: We get the desired equality by considering the coefficient X d−i .
Lemma 15. For d ≥ 1, we have:
Proof. The function ∆ d is a determinant of dimension d+1. We can note that the first line is composed of d+1 times the value 1 since for 0 ≤ j ≤ d, s We do not change the value of the determinant by adding each column to its right neighbor. After this operation, the first line is composed of one time the value 1 and d times the value 0. After this addition and using lemma 14, the term (i + 1, j + 1) is: Proof. By induction. Indeed, the formula is straightforward for d = 1 and
Assume that it is true for d − 1, on get:
.
Using the formula of lemma 15, we get the result.
